

# Professor Nabudere and UPC

By Yoga Adhola  
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Professor Dan Nabudere is perhaps the most prolific author ever on Uganda affairs. He was also Marxist. These two credentials make him a very significant writer on Uganda affairs. He has also written a lot on Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) and this article is an attempt to critique what he has said about UPC. This critique is guided by our view that the theoretical framework informing Nabudere's analysis is bedeviled by three serious flaws. The first and probably most fundamental flaw is his assumption that social-economic development in Uganda has reached the point where politics is based on social classes. In our view Uganda society is still largely pre-capitalist with a thin veneer of bourgeois culture. Because of this, identity issues, caste preconceptions and religious attachments still obscure class relationships. (Golan, Galia: 1988: 48, 64-67) It is necessary for us to resolve these identity issues before we can move full throttle into class struggles.

The next flaw in Nabudere's theoretical framework involves Chairman Mao's teaching on contradictions. Chairman Mao taught that in any process there are always a number of contradictions. In handling any such complex processes, it is incumbent on us to arrange those contradictions in terms of which is fundamental, principal and secondary. It is only after that that we can tackle the process meaningfully. (Chairman Mao "On Contradictions") Nabudere mistook the fundamental contradiction for the principal one. A fundamental contradiction is the one which runs from the beginning of a process to its end. A good example is the contradiction between imperialism and the people or between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This contradiction runs from the beginning of the capitalist mode of production to its end; on the other hand, the principal contradiction runs from the beginning of a phase in the struggle to the end of the particular phase. (Nabudere, D.W. 1977: 250; Amin, Samir: 203: 25, 26) This theoretical confusion was to cause Professor Nabudere to come up with erroneous analysis.

The other deficiency in Nabudere's theoretical framework is the absence of the theory of national-democratic liberation. While the words national-democratic liberation appears on page 125 (Nabudere 1977:125), it is neither defined nor used. This is an indication he did not really know what the concept means. To understand national-democratic liberation it is necessary for us to remember Chairman Mao's teaching that struggles go on in phases. In Uganda we went through the anti-colonial struggles which began around 1900 and ended in 1962. The phase we are in now is that of national-democratic struggles. The phase is similar to the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Europe. The bourgeois-democratic revolution got rid of feudalism and ushered in the capitalist mode of production. The national-democratic revolution too is to get rid of aspects of pre-capitalist modes of production. It is to prepare ground for the socialist revolution.

The three flaws we have cited above did distort Nabudere's analysis of UPC, beginning right with the very formation of Uganda Peoples Congress. As UPC was a merger between a section of Uganda National Congress (UNC) and Uganda Peoples' Union (UPU), Nabudere correctly begins his analysis of the formation of UPC by analyzing UNC. "In its organisational efforts, the UNC suffered from the narrow ideological forms that emanated from its petty-bourgeoisie class base, the historical conditions and the divisive colonial superstructures that existed in the country. Its efforts to break down these barriers were made even more difficult by forces of religion, ethnic divisions, and other sectional differences which had always played a divisive role in politics of national liberation. Having no scientific world outlook, and overwhelmed by strong petty-bourgeois material conditions, it moved with these currents, adopting contradictory policy positions, it moved with the currents, adopting

contradictory positions in the various areas where it sought to establish itself. Given the narrow and sectional world outlook of the petty-bourgeois mass splits became the order of the day as the struggle towards self-determination advanced, thus demonstrating again the inconsistency of the petty bourgeois as a class." (Nabudere, D.W. 1977: 156)

As we have already stated, the Ugandan society was still socially and economically not developed enough to give rise to relationships and/or politics based on social classes. This being the case, where was Nabudere deriving his politics based on social classes from? His analysis quoted here simply misses a lot of points. There were demands for a number of identity issues to be resolved before moving on to politics based on social classes or even to move to independence. It is these issues that Nabudere calls "forces of religion, ethnic divisions, and other sectional differences". The point is these were/are legitimate democratic demands that required resolution. They could or can not simply be wished away.

Let us first briefly analyse the splits in UNC before the UPU/UNC merger that Nabudere is talking about. The anti-colonial struggles went through three phases. These phases were distilled by the first professor of History at the University of Dar es salaam, Professor T.O. Ranger. He wrote a seminal article in which he advanced the theory that the anti-colonial struggles went through three phases. (Ranger, T.O. 1968 ) The first phase, which he named 'Primary Resistance', was the resistance to what the natives saw as foreign intrusion into their societies. At one-point Professor Ranger called these "last-ditch resisters". Examples of these "last ditch resisters" are Omukama Kabalega and Kabaka Mwanga who waged serious wars against colonialism. (Low, A.D. 2013; Lwanga-Lunyigo)

After primary resistance had been defeated, we entered the phase of "secondary resistance" At this phase, colonialism had been accepted. The struggles were to gain better terms for the subjects. It was in this context that Musazi helped found the Uganda Motor Drivers' Association, the first ever trade union in Uganda in 1938. Musazi was also involved in organizing farmers to secure better prices for their produce. In this regard he helped in the formation of the Bataka Party as well as the Uganda African Farmers Union. After the Bataka riots, both the Bataka Party and the UAFU were banned. Not cowed by the ban, he next organized the Federation of Partnership which went bankrupt in 1950.

At the instigation and encouragement of certain British and other foreign anti-colonialists who were operating in Uganda, Musazi next organized the Uganda National Congress, the first political party in Uganda. Dr George Shepherd, an American who came to assist with the organization of co-operative movements was to write: "I soon decided that it was important, both for the welfare of the people of Uganda and the co-operative movement that a political party be launched. This would take the pressure off the Federation of Farmers to be a political unit itself. And it would bring into the field an organization that would openly deal in the political issues, which after all were the decisive ones." (Shepherd, G. 1955: 94)

The final phase of the anti-colonial struggles was that of "mass nationalism". This is the phase when the people wanted an end to colonialism. Obote belonged to this phase of mass nationalism. There is a sense in which the change of leadership from Musazi to Obote was a move from one phase of the anti-colonial struggle to the next one. It was a move from a primary or secondary resistance movement (Ranger, T.O. 1968: ; Stokes, E. 1970: 100-106) which both the Bataka Party and Uganda Farmers Union respectively had been into a modern anti-colonial movement which would not only be anti-imperialist but would also champion the aspirations of minorities in Uganda.

The first indication that the anti-colonial struggles needed to move from one phase to the other was the abortive attempt by younger members of the UNC who had had greater exposure to the struggle than

Musazi, and who were dissatisfied with his leadership, to form the abortive Uganda Congress Party in 1957. A year later John Kale, the father of the former Inspector General of Police, Kale Kayihura opened a UNC office in Cairo and also began operating a radio station for UNC. This Cairo office, David Apter, tells us in his book, "The Political kingdom in Uganda" became symptomatic of the crisis in UNC. The merits of this office were disputed, and the Uganda National Congress was to irrevocably get split over this disagreement. A section of the membership of UNC, led by Musazi, felt that the Cairo office was a means of trading the imperialism of one country for that of another, especially a country (meaning Egypt) that had for 2,500 years controlled the whole of the Nile Valley, but also communism. (Apter, D.E. 1961: 334) The other section of Uganda National Congress, consisting of elements younger than Musazi but with greater exposure to the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles elsewhere, who not only believed in maintaining contacts with the anti-imperialists world, but desired a more radical nationalist movement of the mobilizing type, striking firmly for a united Uganda while attacking the parochialism of the Lukiiko and the Baganda.

The contention between these two political lines came to a head on January 12, 1959. The previous month three senior members of the Uganda National Congress (Abu Mayanja, Jolly Joe Kiwanuka, and Dr. Kununka) had attended the Pan-African Congress in Accra, Ghana. They had participated in passing resolutions which, among other things, recommended that ".....those African traditional institutions whether political, social or economic which clearly have shown their reactionary character and the sordid support of colonialism be condemned." Returning from Accra via Cairo, where they called at the controversial office, Kiwanuka defended the Cairo office and identified the real issue at stake: Uganda cannot remain an island in a sea of Pan-African and universal nationalism.... Our establishment of a nationalist political office in Cairo has marked a great era in our struggle. It has broken the chains of isolation, and focused world attention on the seriousness of the Uganda people in our unshakable upsurge for freedom." ( Apter, D.E. 1961:334; Uganda Argus, January 10 1959)

To Musazi, that statement was a sacrilege which could not be tolerated in the Uganda National Congress. He proceeded to expel some six of the most significant officials of the UNC who supported the Cairo office. In announcing their expulsion, Musazi indicated that he would never trade the imperialism of one country for that of another, especially a country that had for 2,500 years controlled the whole of the Nile Valley, and that the group he expelled had no sense of discipline. Musazi also felt that the Cairo office had Communist backing." (Apter, D.E. 1961: 334) The response of the six and their political followers did not take long to come.

At the Annual Delegates Conference held on January 12, 1959, Ignatius Musazi, President of the Uganda National Congress, was expelled from the UNC and Apollo Milton Obote elected to replace him. The conference also went on to endorse all the resolutions taken at the Accra Conference. The significance of these events is/was succinctly captured by David Apter's observation: "...the old Congress ended . . . Congress had now entered the Pan-African phase of nationalism." (Apter, D.E. 1961: 334) From then on too, the non-Ganda joined Uganda National Congress in large numbers; formerly under Ganda leadership, it made little headway." (La Fontaine in Low, D.A. 1971: 254 Footnote 64) This is the faction of UNC which merged with the UPU to form the Uganda Peoples Congress.

What was UPU? In December 1958, shortly after the newly elected members of the Legislative Council (Legico) had taken their seats, a new party calling itself the Uganda Peoples Union (UPU) was formed. (Lowenkopf M. ;Gertzel, C.1976: 93) It was formed by members of the Legico, one of whom had just resigned from the UNC. David Apter says: "Members of the party view the Legislative Council as the important body of the future. By developing a strong parliamentary organisation, they have sought to wrest advantages for the non-Baganda areas of Uganda so long as Buganda preferred to

act non-corporatively. One important impetus for the party has been the more or less open assumption of political superiority by the Baganda. This was brought home sharply when the former Omuwanika of Buganda indicated that the Kabaka should be King of Uganda. Other groups took sharp exception of the statement. The Uganda Peoples Union represents the first major effort at political organisation outside Buganda. In its own way it represents a different form of attack on Buganda. Properly organized, the non-Baganda representatives in the legislature can dominate the Baganda, unless the representative proportions of the Legislative Council members are altered to favour Buganda. With the establishment of a more representative system, the Baganda would be in the awkward position of having to rely on political parties and coalitions in order to achieve their ends. (Apter, D. 1961: 346-347). In forming the Uganda People's Union, the non-Ganda who broke away were making a statement to the effect that they were not going to stomach the social dominance of the Baganda any longer. That they were going to resist it. The Baganda got this message. An editorial in a Luganda paper, Uganda *Eyogera*, of 19th December 1958 observed: "It is generally felt that non-Ganda formed themselves into a party in an attempt to raise a force against the Baganda". (Lowenkopf, M. 1961: 65)

Obote who remained in the UNC rapidly acquired a commanding position in the dominant wing of the party. This position was to prove a major asset in the ideological crisis that UNC was later to undergo. This crisis arose out of the need for the Uganda National Congress to transform itself from a 'primary' or 'secondary' resistance movement (Ranger, T.O. 1968: ; Stokes, E. 1970: 100-100) which both the Bataka Party and Uganda Farmers Union, respectively, had been into a modern anti-colonial movement which would not only be anti-imperialist but would also champion the aspirations of minorities. Earlier, a similar need had caused a number of the younger members of the UNC to break-off and form the abortive United Congress Party. (Apter, D.E. 1961: 333)

David Apter makes another observation: "Confused over tactics, unable to discover what line to take with the Kabaka, [with] mainly Baganda in its following, the old Congress could never develop into a mass political movement." (Apter, D 1961: 332) This quagmire was broken when Obote was elected leader of UNC. With Obote's election as President of Uganda National Congress, both the leadership of the UNC (which was the most significant political organization in the country) and the unofficial members of the Legico had dovetailed into one leader: Apollo Milton Obote. Furthermore, for the first time in three centuries, the initiative was in the hands of the non-Baganda. The Baganda had not only lost the leadership of the forces that were moving history at the time, but their opponents had the upper hand in the Wild Committee which was setting up the ground rules for independence.

This Obote wing of UNC eventually merged with the UPU to form UPC. UPC was formed in preparation for independence. This was done because independence was going to constitute a major watershed from which major changes would flow. The membership of UPC found it necessary to politically organise themselves into a political party. About such changes Professor Wallerstein has opined "By ethnic (read nationality/identity) I mean the sentiment shared by a group of people who define their boundary in cultural terms (a common language, religion, color history, style of life rights in the political arena in order to defend the possibilities of their material conditions. Whether such a group prefers to call itself a nation, a nationality, or an ethnic group, a tribe, a people or any of the other sundry terms that are used is not very material to the fact that ethnic consciousness is latent everywhere but it is only realized when groups feel either threatened with loss of previously acquired privilege or conversely feel it is opportune moment politically to overcome long-standing denial of privilege." (Wallerstein, I. 1960: 184; 1973: 168)

However, we must hasten to point out that the members of UPC were not the only force preparing for these changes. Other forces too, particularly what later became the nemesis of UPC, the kingdom of Buganda, were also organising themselves. In the words of Professor Wallenstein the kingdom of

Buganda was being "threatened with loss of previously acquired privileges". These acquired privileges consisted of the status of a dominant identity. Buganda had begun emerging as the dominant power in that region from around 1600. (Kiwanuka, M.S.M. 1975: 19-32; Roberts, A.D 1962; Gray, J.M. 1963) When the British arrived 300 years later, they used Baganda as mercenaries to help them conquer the rest of the territories that eventually constituted Uganda. Having carved out their colony, the British also used the Baganda as initial administrators of the non-Ganda territories. Both the use as mercenaries as well as initial administrators filled the Baganda with immense pride and chauvinism. On the other hand it filled other nationalities with deep resentment of the Baganda. It is these two dialectical feelings that gave rise to the contradiction between the Baganda as an identity, on the one hand, and the other nationalities politically organised into UPC, on the other.

We shall now trace the evolution of the Ganda social force from around 1953. That is about the same time the UPC force began as UNC. By 1953, the decolonization process which had begun with India in 1947 was fast catching-up in Uganda. Yet much as the British desired Uganda to become independent as one country, as early as 1949 it had become clear that Buganda was set on a course of separating from the rest of Uganda. (Apter, D.E. 1961: 261 ;) And so, to proceed with the decolonization of Uganda, the British found it necessary to reverse the separatist tendencies of Buganda. The previous year Sir Andrew Cohen had been appointed Governor of Uganda. One of the main tasks he was assigned to undertake was to reverse the separatist tendencies of Buganda. To this effect Cohen sought to make changes in the governance of Buganda so as to bring into prominence the Baganda who were Uganda nationalists. The Kabaka rejected these changes and the Governor then deported Kabaka Mutesa to Britain. The intention of the deportation was to replace Mutesa as Kabaka with a prince who would accept the changes that Cohen was proposing. This strategy did not work and Mutesa had to come back and resume the kabakaship in 1955.

Much as a new agreement to update the 1900 agreement was put in place, the unintended consequence of Mutesa's return, in a manner which appeared he had won, was to make the Baganda feel they could negotiate with the British without taking into account the views and feelings of the rest of Ugandans. Some extremist Baganda even felt that independence should be handed to them. Thus for instance, at a meeting of the Lukiiko in 1957, the Omuwanika (Treasurer) of Buganda let slip a remark that Uganda ought to become a "Federal state under the Kabaka". These acts of chauvinism gave rise to a crescendo of hostility in the rest of the country. The Katikiros (Chancellors) of the Western Province kingdoms talked of forming the Western Provincial Council to resist Buganda. In the rest of the country, contrary to earlier expectations by the Baganda, Legico members organized the District Councils to pass angry resolutions against the chauvinism of the Baganda.

As the resentment to Ganda chauvinism mounted, Professor Anthony Low, then teaching history at Makerere, reported that rumours began to spread that "the old and widespread hostility against them (the Baganda chauvinists) would be channeled into a new-style political party." (Low, D.A. 1971: 190) As all this was going on amongst the political groupings of Ugandans, the British methodically continued preparing the country for independence. On October 10, 1957 the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, while in Uganda as part of an East African fact finding mission, gave his approval to the unanimous view in the colony that direct elections for the Legico be held in 1958.

However, by this time, the Buganda Government's initially positive stance toward direct elections had eroded, as had its concomitant enthusiasm to be involved in the Legico. Not only did Buganda view an accelerated movement toward independence with foreboding, but the neo-traditionalist had come to realise that direct elections in Buganda, whether to the Legico or to the Lukiiko, represented a serious threat to their hold on power in Buganda. This is what informed the boycott of the Legico elections in 1958. The following year, two things which stoked the fires of the Buganda separatism occurred. One,

following internal contradictions within the Uganda National Congress, Milton Obote was elected to lead the UNC. With Obote's election as President of UNC, both the leadership of the UNC, the most significant political organisation in the country, and the unofficial members of the Legico, had dovetailed into one person. Furthermore, for the first time in about three centuries, the initiative was in the hands of the non-Baganda. The Baganda had not only lost the leadership of the forces then moving history at the time, but their opponents had the upper hand in the Wild Committee, which was setting up the ground rules for independence. Secondly, the Wild Committee which had been tasked to study and make recommendations on constitutional development in the colony made its report in 1959.

While the setting up of this committee was clearly inspired by Buganda's refusal to participate in the 1958 Legico elections, ironically Buganda refused to participate in this committee. The one thing the Wild Committee recommended which incensed the Baganda, was the principle of direct elections to the Legico with no special safeguards for Buganda. The Baganda had wanted this as a prelude to government through representation. About these two events, Prof. Mutibwa has written: "As a reaction to the publication of the Wild Report, whose committee Mengo had boycotted, Buganda authorities decided to demand once again separate independence for their kingdom." The Baganda appear to have been in a near panic. There were attempts to form a party of their own - the Uganda National Party (UNP) - which, it was even suggested, could merge with the new UPC. It was all a gamble, especially as the Mengo Establishment was faced, apparently for the first time, with fears that Obote might become Uganda's first Prime Minister. Certainly, the prospects of being governed by a non-Muganda filled the Baganda with dismay." (Mutibwa. P.M. 2008: 32)

It is against this background that Buganda's decision to renew the demand for separate independence by January 1, 1961 should be viewed. The British Government refused to be drawn into any fresh arguments with Buganda on this topic. They simply ignored the Buganda Lukiiko's resolution when it was submitted to Westminster via Entebbe, and when January 1, 1961 arrived, Buganda was as much a part of the Uganda Protectorate as before. In short, that was the end of the matter. While ignoring Buganda's declaration of independence, the colonial authorities also continued preparing for elections. The Baganda responded by boycotting the elections. Buganda, with 24 electoral constituencies, had 36,000 voters, a mere 4 to 5 percent of the eligible voters registering. This was in stark contrast to the rest of the country that consisted of 58 electoral constituencies, and where 1,300,433 out of the estimated 1,500,000 to 1,750,000 registered to vote, a figure which represented over 75 per cent of those enfranchised.

In an effort to resolve the crisis in the relationship between Buganda and the colonial authorities as well as other nationalities (tribes), Obote secured the appointment of a commission under the chairmanship of Lord Munster. (Santhymurthy, T.V. ) After four months of deliberations and consultations, the Uganda Relationship Commission, as it was called, submitted its report in June 1961. The Munster Commission recommended that Buganda's separatist demands should be incorporated in the Constitution as some sort of federal arrangement. In this regard the Munster Commission envisaged a Uganda consisting of a federal Buganda, and semi-federal Toro, Ankole, and Bunyoro. The Commission also recommended indirect elections for Buganda's representatives to the National Assembly, the inviolability of Buganda's constitution, Buganda's independent treasury, a separate High Court and a semi-independent police force, but not an independent army, nor exclusive control of Entebbe and Kampala.

The proposals of the Munster Commission were later discussed at the Lancaster House Conference in October 1961. At the deliberations, with the assistance of UPC (and strongly resisted by the DP), Buganda attained most of its desires. About this, Mutesa was to write in his book: "The talks were successful. With Obote's support we obtained a great deal of what we wanted and looked to receive the

rest later.....” (Mutesa ) Notwithstanding this satisfaction with the results of the Constitutional Conference, Buganda, having boycotted the 1961 elections which brought an illegitimate DP government in power, continued its firm resistance to Kiwanuka’s government.

Another Constitutional conference to resolve the remaining matters was slated for later in the year, but Buganda was in no mood to attend it. It is at this point in time that UPC (and Obote in particular) took up serious negotiations to persuade Buganda to attend the conference. Subsequently, on September 5, 1961, Obote, as UPC leader, issued a statement in which he outlined a strategy for persuading Buganda to participate in the forthcoming constitutional conference to prepare for independence. He invited the Lukiiko to join hands with the UPC and form a “partnership” during the conference. He pointed out that it was the Lukiiko, and not the Buganda DP members of Parliament that was supported by the overwhelming majority of the people in Buganda. He argued that since, as evidenced by the results of the elections, UPC represented the majority of those outside Buganda, then “in the event of the opposition party (UPC) coming to an understanding with the Lukiiko, the British Government must accept that understanding with the Lukiiko, as one between Buganda and the rest of the country.”

Four days later, a UPC delegation led by Obote met a Buganda delegation led by the Katikiro, Michael Kintu. Later in the day a reliable source was quoted by the ‘Uganda Argus’ as saying: “that full and complete agreement had been reached on points which were either left open when the Constitutional Committee saw the Governor, or on which there was disagreement.” Following this accord, Buganda took steps to attend the conference that began on September 18. As expected, the UPC supported Buganda’s desires on the manner of selecting her 21 representatives to the National Assembly. The two parties also advanced their common position on the timetable for the next elections. Against strong opposition from the DP, these two demands were endorsed by the conference, and a *de facto* alliance between UPC and the neo-traditionalists was sealed.

The Constitutional Conference also arrived at a unanimous consensus that however important the elections of March 1961 had been, in view of the boycott, they could not constitute the basis for governance. To remedy this, the DP had proposed that fresh elections should be held after independence. Both the UPC and the Buganda delegations pressed for fresh elections immediately and before independence. The Conference eventually resolved that elections would be held in April 1962. It was also ruled that the elections of the Lukiiko of Buganda should be early enough ( at least 14 days before the nomination day for national elections) for it to take decisions on the form of elections in Buganda. This deadline was necessary in case the Lukiiko opted for direct elections, and so voters in Buganda would have had time to be registered at the same time as those of the rest of the country.

Ganda chauvinism eventually took organisation form as Kabaka Yekka. It is great irony that Nabudere blames UPC for the emergence of KY. "UPC's short-term strategies led to the emergence of the Kabaka Yekka (KY) as a component part of the independence government." (Nabudere, D. W. 1977: 157) UPC had absolutely nothing to do with the formation of KY. KY was the brainchild of Masemba Kabali. (Hancock, I. 1970; Gertzel, C. 1976: 103 ) The immediate impetus to the emergence of KY can be traced to the return of the Kabaka from exile in 1955. Following the return of the Kabaka two developments that heralded the emergence of Kabaka Yeka occurred. One, there emerged a neo-traditionalist group which effectively controlled politics and administration in Buganda. Coinciding with the emergence of the neo-traditionalist, there developed increasing isolation of Buganda from the rest of the colony. At this very same time a contradiction developed in Buganda. The contradiction was between supporters of Mikaeri Kintu, the katikiro who desired Buganda to separate from the rest of the colony as a means of protecting *ebbyafe* or our things, on the one hand, and on the other hand, educated politicians who were described as progressives. These progressives desired independence for

Uganda, including Buganda, as well as reforms in the administration of Buganda. It is to resolve this crisis that Kabaka Yekka was launched.

The late Professor Nabudere never took to heart the teaching of Chairman Mao that struggles take place in phases. In Uganda the first phase was the anti-colonial struggles which ran from about 1900 to 1962. The next phase was that of national-democratic liberation. The concept national-democratic liberation was hammered out at a conference called in December 1960 in Moscow. That conference had been called to chart a roadmap into the future for political parties operating in countries which were attaining independence at the time. These were countries

Nabudere's account of the events on the eve and morrow of independence leaves, a lot to be desired. The events were dominated by the question which was well-put by one analyst as the "Buganda Question". He put it thus: "Among these tensions one in particular has decisively shaped the country's politics, the tension between the Baganda and the other peoples of Uganda. Politically, this tension takes the form of the Buganda question, the dimensions and ramifications of which are many but the core of which can be simply stated: what place should Buganda, its ruler the Kabaka, and its people the Baganda occupy in the emerging national society? It has not been an easy question for Ugandans to answer. To many Baganda they are an elite people, endowed with a superior culture, superior economic wealth, and superior political traditions. To those among them who have thought about the matter at all, it was until fairly recently almost inconceivable that they should not provide the leadership for the new state. To many non-Baganda such claims have appeared pretentious, the wealth not wholly deserved, and the traditions a liability. While valuing much that Buganda has attained, particularly the relative well-being of its people and its political successes during the colonial period, the others have been no more prepared to put up with the Baganda overrule than with British overrule." (Hopkins, T.K. 251) This was the principal contradiction. And it pitied Baganda on the one side and the rest of the nationalities of Uganda on the other. Contrary to what Nabudere wrote, imperialism had no role in this.

Rather than see the issue as an identity problem, Professor Nabudere saw it as a class problem. This is how he viewed it: "While this intermediary class of the petty bourgeois was emerging in the country as a whole, in Buganda it began to push a new line of politics which pointed to the need for Buganda's separatism from the rest of the country and for it to have its 'own things' . Why was this? Nabudere explains: "In our view the explanation lies in the class character of the petty bourgeoisie." (Nabudere, D.W. 1977: 148) Nabudere goes further in the very next page: "In Uganda at the period under consideration, the petty bourgeoisie in Buganda regarded themselves in their understanding of things as being better circumstanced than the petty bourgeoisie in other parts of the country." (Nabudere, D.W. 1977: 149) The point Nabudere misses is the fact that the Buganda identity had been dominant ever since it started eclipsing Bunyoro as the dominant power in the region from around 1600. (Kiwanuka, M.S.M. Roberts, A.D . 1962) As a dominant power, the Baganda identity embraced chauvinism as its ideology. The Baganda as a whole, and not just the petty bourgeois as Professor Nabudere would like to argue, felt themselves to be superior to the rest of the Ugandans. This is how Professor Mutibwa: "On the other hand, the Baganda too harbour a somewhat arrogant attitude towards the non-Baganda, particularly those who come from non kingdom areas. For instance, an ordinary Muganda, however poor or uneducated he may be, believes that people from non-kingdom areas are unruly, uncouth and are not fit to rule." (Mutibwa, P.M. 2008: xi) Professor Colin Leys when teaching a class in which this author was, reported that the poorest Muganda beggar thought himself a thousand times better off than Prime Minister Obote.

Apart from misconstruing the principal contradiction, Nabudere also misconstrued events and forces operating on the eve and morrow of independence. While the principal contradiction involved social

identities, Nabudere misconstrued it as struggles between social classes. He also sought to characterise the contradictions between identities as contradictions which were contrived by imperialism. To this effect he wrote: "But what were these secondary contradictions among the people that imperialism exacerbated for the petty bourgeoisie to bring to the fore? They were principally the ethnic contradiction, the religious contradiction, the racial contradiction and the intra-bourgeois class contradictions." (Nabudere D.W. 1977: 251) In one word, these are social identities.

What Nabudere refers to as religious contradictions was the contradiction that eventually took the political organisation forms of DP and KY. While to the superficial observer this might appear to be a contradiction between Protestants and Catholics organised as DP and KY, the actual reality is that these are social identities. The origins of these social identities can be traced to the religious wars that ravaged Buganda in the late 19th century. In the course of these wars, Catholics and Protestants, apart from being religions, also acquired the character of social identities. The last battle was fought between Protestants and Catholics in February 1892. The Protestants won and went on to constitute the administration at Mengo. Catholics became second class citizens and were despised as well as discriminated against. These became the grievances that eventually undergirded DP. ( )

Professor Nabudere also totally misconstrued the significance of the Kabaka. According to him, ".....Mutesa was no longer a feudalist but a petty bourgeois monarch". (Nabudere, D.W. 264) He further wrote: "What Mutesa sought in the alliance was therefore dictatorial powers for himself. Having not been elected himself and claiming the powers of feudality that no longer existed, he in fact wished to impose himself on the people supported by his section of British monopolies, the Church of England, and his local faction of the bourgeoisie." (Nabudere, D.W. 1977: 254) This Nabudere's view of the Kabaka is miles away from the reality that obtained then. To most Baganda of those days Mutesa was virtually a demigod. They could not imagine life without the Kabaka. They also could not imagine anybody being higher than the Kabaka in status on Buganda soil. It is this reality which forced UPC, a potentially Republican party, to provide a situation where Mutesa would become ceremonial president. That way the Kabaka would not be lower in status to anybody. Not appreciating the tactics involved in assuaging the desires of the Baganda for nobody to be above the Kabaka in status, Nabudere wrote: " Efforts by Obote to contain the situation, by getting Mutesa elected president of Uganda, only served to fan the rivalry between the two." (Nabudere, D.W. 1977: 257) It is also amazing that Professor Nabudere could say this. Mutesa was elected president in 1963, that is a year before the Gulu Conference where the contradictions first got revealed.

It did not take long after independence for cracks to appear in the UPC/KY alliance. This was bound to happen. We had entered a new phase of struggle with totally different forms of struggle. This is the phase of national-democratic liberation. The cracks in the alliance were triggered by two things. The opening of UPC branches in Buganda. Two, UPC sponsored candidates for by-elections in Buganda. However, the straw which completely broke the camel's back, so to speak, was the referendum on the lost counties. The "lost counties" was the territory which the British transferred from Bunyoro to Buganda as a reward for the assistance Buganda rendered in the subjugation of Bunyoro. (Doyle, Shane 2009; Low, A.D. 2013)

Cracks also arose in UPC itself. While Nabudere characterise this contradiction as between the left (as represented by John Kakonge) and the right (represented by Grace Ibibgira), in reality it was the struggle between national-democratic liberation which Nabudere designates the left and the resistance to national-democratic liberation which Nabudere labels as the right. National-democratic liberation is the desire to transform Uganda from what colonialism left. The idea of national-democratic liberation was first promulgated at a conference held in Moscow in 1961. (Lowenthal, R. 1964, ©1963] ) The struggle for national-democratic liberation is analogous to the struggles that Fidel Castro talked about

when he said: "What does October 10, 1868, signify for our people? What does this glorious date mean for the revolutionaries of our nation? It simply signifies the beginning of one hundred years of struggle, the beginning of the Revolution in Cuba, because in Cuba there has only been one revolution: that which was begun by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes on October 10, 1868, the revolution our people are still carrying forward." (Fidel Castro, speech at the commemoration meeting held at La Demajagua, October 10, 1968.)" (Woddis, J. 1072:188) The struggles Castro is talking about is what prepared the ripe revolutionary situation upon which the Cuban revolution was based. The same struggle is analogous to the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in 1905. This struggle first broke out in UPC at the Annual Delegates Conference in 1964. At that time it took the form of a contest between John Kakonge (representing the forces of national-democratic liberation and Grace Ibingira (representing the forces against national-democratic liberation) for the position of Secretary General of UPC. Grace Ibingira won.

Professor Nabudere dwells very much on the manouvers which went on to get Grace Ibingira elected Secretary General of UPC. His aim is to paint Obote as some sort of undemocratic tyrant afraid of the ideologically tuned John Kakonge. What he didn't know or chose not to reveal is the antipathy of the old guard who came to UPC at the time of its formation as individuals with baskets of support from their respective areas to form UPC. These men were very powerful in the then nascent UPC. One of these old guards was Wilberforce Nadioppe, the Vice President of the party. Kirunda Kivejinja tells us in his book that Nadioppe once threatened to gather his MPs from Busoga and cross the floor and sit with the opposition if Kakonge was not handled. (Kirunda Kivejinja, A.M. 1995; Adhola, Y. 2014) Obote was very aware of the damage the Nadiopes of this world could cause. He gave in to their demands knowing full well that he could easily make amends with John Kakonge afterwards. Meanwhile he would have saved the party from disintegration before it had been consummated. On Obote making it with Kakonge we have the testimony of Matthew Rukikaire, described by Nabudere as the leader of Ibingira's puppet youth league. (Nabudere, D.W. ) Rukikaire wrote: "In fact, having clipped Kakonge's political wings at the Gulu conference, Obote did not wait long before starting the process of rehabilitating him." (Rukikaire, M. 2019: 114)

Instead of viewing this struggle as being between national-democratic liberation and the resistance to it, Nabudere viewed it as a struggle between the right and the left. To this effect he wrote: "The ascendancy of the right over the left marked the beginning of the crisis in the neo-colony's politics that started manifesting itself late 1964, and which matured late 1965 only to come in the open in February 1966. Indeed it can be said that April 1964 was the watershed of a new realignment of political forces, marking a new phase in which the forces of minor interests of the narrow-minded petty bourgeois. This is how he described these struggles: "While it was possible to stand by UPC in its efforts to win independence for Uganda at this time, it also became increasingly clear with the passage of time that it's petty bourgeois narrowness of interest could not advance unity among the people of Uganda. Such unity was only possible on the basis of continued anti-imperialist struggle of the people of Uganda as a whole, for therein lay the fundamental interest of workers and peasants of Uganda, to attain economic equality they sought." (Nabudere, D.W. 1977: 254) Nabudere couldn't realise that given the situation obtaining, particularly the low level of the development of the economic base which couldn't have given rise to class struggles as yet, it is necessary for us to resolve those issues which he describes as "petty bourgeois narrowness of interest" before people can move to wage class struggles or even struggles against imperialism.

These struggles went on until the climax in 1966 when the revolution occurred. Professor Nabudere denies that a revolution ever took place in Uganda. "One view, to which the present writer (Nabudere) subscribed to, was that since there had been no revolution in Uganda in 1966, the ideology of the country...." (Nabudere, D.W. 1977: 274) This denial stems from his perspective of viewing things in

class terms. In 1966 the struggle was between social identities. The Ganda identity had been dominant since around 1600. When the British colonised Uganda, they simply modernised the Ganda state and used the Baganda initially as mercenaries to subjugate other identities. After the subjugation, they also used them as initial administrators. During the entire period that colonialism lasted, Buganda and the Baganda as an identity were treated differently as compared to the other identities. In the context of this long period of domination, what occurred in 1966 could be viewed as a revolution. It was a revolution that overthrew a dominant identity. Professor Mazrui summarised it very well when he said that in 1966 Buganda was humbled: "In 1966 Buganda was humbled." (Mazrui, A.A. 1970: 1087) Professor Colin Leys, when teaching a class in which the author of this article was, also said there had occurred a status reversal.

Secondly, the events of 1966 could be viewed as a revolution that occurred in the superstructure. (Golan, Galia: 1988: 124-5) For as long as the economic base of the society had not matured sufficiently, no coincidental social revolution could occur. However, by abolishing the monarchies, Obote had carried out a revolution in the superstructure. And so while what happened in Uganda in 1967 was not a socialist revolution; however, "...for, so long as the economic base had not matured sufficiently, there could not be a coincident social revolution. As much as the ripened conditions were missing, the national liberation revolution was a change of a political but not social nature; in other words, it would not produce socialism. Furthermore, as already argued, it was more akin to the classical bourgeois revolutions, necessitating, a later, a purely socialist revolution (and in the interim, the continued use rather than elimination of pre-socialist economic institutions such as NEP)."

In 1969 Obote embarked on what he called "the move to the left". These were moves to bring about what Obote called socialism in Uganda. Obote was not alone in this attempt. Like other national-democrats the world over, Obote was doing what to him was the best for his country ( we discuss this in the chapter on the move to the left). In terms of Marxist-Leninist categorisation, what Obote was doing is what is called national socialism. This national socialism has been described as ".....an ideology primarily of the non-proletarian strata which had not yet worked out an independent political theory but nevertheless rejected capitalism." (Golan, G. 1988: 111) Professor Nabudere dismissed the move to the left with contempt. The way to handle this national socialism is not outright rejection the way Nabuderere did. We need to first identify the two component aspects of national socialism, namely the reformist, or conservative reformist, on the one hand, and the revolutionary democratic on the other. The former was based and oriented towards the bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie; the later toward the peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and semi proletariat. `

In 1971 the Amin coup took place and Nabudere joined the Amin government. While this may not be questioned too much, because he had been in prison, his later actions need to be examined. When the war against Amin reached somewhere around Budo, the Tanzanians realised that with the fall of Idi Amin, they could find themselves in the awkward situation of being in charge of Uganda. They therefore slowed down the pace of the war so as to compose some sort of government made up Ugandans. A conference was convened in Moshi to constitute this government. Because of the paranoia the British had for Obote, the organisation of the conference was placed in Nabudere's hands. To this outfit, Nabudere incorporated Grace Ibingira. (It should be remembered that Grace Ibingira had been the leader of the forces against national-democratic liberation.) Nabudere and Ibingira were so-so-satisfied with this arrangement that they called it a coup de grace. They then moved to obstruct UPC delegates and seat Lule as President. Lule was the candidate for the British establishment.

## NOTES

( ) The details of the struggle from 1964 to 1966 are found on pages.

( ) This is covered in chapter

( ) Around the time of the conference, Ibingira tells us in his book that he approached Nadiope and told him about the necessity of replacing Obote as leader of the party. "I felt that if Obote was going to stand in the way of this alliance and consequently stop UPC from exercising power, he had to be evicted from his leadership role. The only person I mentioned this to was W.W Nadiope, then VP of UPC and probably the most powerful figure in the party. He agreed with my views at a brief meeting held at Uganda Club; my aim had been to replace Obote with Nadiope." (Ibingira, G 202)

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