The Social Base of Uganda Peoples' Congress

From Yoga Adhola

Two authorities have pronounced on the social base of Uganda Peoples' Congress. First the President of Uganda, Mr Yoweri Museveni views UPC as religion based i.e. Protestant. "The UPC, which had no base in Buganda, was a Protestant-based party......." (Museveni, Y.K. 1977: 35) On the other hand, Professor Mahmood Mamadani has described UPC as a traders' party: "For the UNC the Kabaka’s return created an acute political crisis that it was unable to survive. Its constituent elements, the kulaks and the traders, assumed organizational independence from one another. The kulaks went the way of the Buganda lukiko, later to reemerge as a political party, the Kabaka Yekka (KY); the traders, after a short life as Uganda Peoples’ Union, donned the cloak of Uganda Peoples’ Congress (UPC) both with their allied intellectuals. The only significant change was that the UPC gradually brought within its fold a section of the latest emerging fraction of the petty bourgeoisie, the state bureaucrats. What was in appearance a regional and tribal split -- between Baganda and non-Baganda -- was in essence a split between the two fractions of the petty bourgeoisie, the kulaks and traders. And it was the traders, the national group par excellence, with the sole grievance--the dominance of a nonnational petty bourgeoisie -- who now proceeded to occupy the national stage.” (Mamdani,M.1976:212)

Both analysts don't explain one thing: why, from their own perspective, was/is there a dichotomy between Buganda and the rest of the country? If UPC is a Protestant party, is Museveni telling us there were no Protestants in Buganda to join UPC? And if UPC is a traders party as Mamdani is telling us, were there no traders in Buagnda to join the traders party? We believe that to explain this dichotomy we need a theory of social identity. Social identity has been defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership." (Tajfel,H:1981: 254) The social identity which will concern us here is the nationality (or tribe as some would like to call it). Just like other social identities, the nationality satisfies the human need for people to self-identify themselves as well as socially locate and moor themselves. It satisfies the human need to identify with others in a shared culture. "The need for identity does not, standardly drive people to seek to achieve an identity, and that is so for two reasons. The first is that people do not usually lack identity: they receive an identity as a bye-product of the rearing process. The right thing to say in most cases, is not that people are motivated by their need for identity, but thye are motivated by their identity, for which they have a strong need, and the motivating power of identity reflects the need it fulfills. Quebecois do not have a need for identity which drives them to become Quebecois. Since they are raised Quebecois, their need for identity is readily satisfied. Quebecois are motivated not to acquire an identity but to protect and celebrate the identity they are given." (Cohen, G.A. 348) It is to protect their respective identities against the domination of the Baganda that members of various dominated or minority nationalities formed or joined themselves into the Uganda Peoples Congress.

The kingdom of Buganda emerged as the dominant power in that region which eventually encompassed Ugand around 1600. Up to that point the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara (2) had been the most powerful nationality in the region. As a result of Bunyoro-Kitara's preoccupation with an attempted secession on her western borders, a situation, which rendered her eastern frontiers relatively undefended; and Buganda's recovery over a period of time, Buganda was able to accumulate adequate military strength with which to effectively launch an offensive against Bunyoro. (Kiwanuka, M.S.M. 1975: 19-30) Being rather limited, these advantages only enabled Buganda to recover her previously lost territory. However, in due course, from the reign of Kabaka Mawanda (1674-1704), as a result of annexing the tributary of Kooki from Bunyoro, Buganda acquired immense advantage. These territories Buganda had acquired had very important consequences: "until then Buganda had been very short of iron and weapons, and had to buy their iron from Bunyoro. Now, however, Bunyoro had lost not only the rich reservoir of technical knowledge of smiths of Buddu and Kooki." (Kiwanuka, M.S.M. 1968: 607) Controlling these strategic factors, and given the fact that Bunyoro was involved in formidable domestic problems, Buganda went on to defeat Bunyoro battle after battle, and consequently eclipsed Bunyoro as a dominant power in the region. This dominance was to last unchallenged until the eve of the colonization of Uganda, when during the reign of Omukama (King) Kabalega, Bunyoro regained her military strength and began recovering her territory. In the course of the two centuries that this dominance lasted, the Baganda embraced an acute sense of nationality chauvinism on the one hand, and the nationalities dominated by the Baganda developed deep resentment of the Baganda.

Yet the Banyoro were not the only people who suffered the humiliation of being conquered and dominated by the Baganda; the other people to suffer were the clans which were eventually to constitute the nationality called Basoga (3) to the east of Buganda. While Kabaka Mawanda and his armies were driving Abagerere through Bulondonganyi into Bukuya, they became attracted to and invaded the rich states of Busoga. At the time the Basoga states were militarily weak and not united. (Kiwanuka, M.S.M. 1971: 76) The Basoga were organized in loose confederation of clans, each of which were not only independent but also jealous of each other and engaged in frequent warfare. Such a state of affairs made Busoga very vulnerable. None other than Professor Kiwanuka, himself a Muganda, tells us that the victories of the Baganda "were sullied by deeds of atrocity, and marked by dreadful slaughter and arson. The terror which Mawanda's armies struck has left the impression that an army of professional brigands could not have behaved worse."(Kiwanuka, S.M. 1971: 76-77) The name of Mawanda unleashed terror and horror among the Basoga, giving rise to the Lusoga (adjective from Busoga) saying " Omuganda Mawanda olumbe lwekirago lwaita mama na taata " (Mawanda, the nefarious Muganda, slaughtered all our mothers and fathers.) (Kiwanuka, M.S.M. 1971: 77) Following the death of Mawanda around 1704, there was a pause in Buganda's wave of aggression and expansionism. The two kings who reigned after Mawanda (Mwanga and Kagulu) had immense personal and domestic problems which confined their energies home. It was when Kyabagu (1704-1734) came to the throne that Buganda reactivated its expansionist campaigns. (Kiwanuka, M.S.M. 1971: 78-80) At one time when Kyabagu led a ferocious band of Baganda to invade Busoga, he found Busoga country pleasant and more peaceful than Buganda and decided to settle in Jinja and incorporate Busoga into Buganda. This evil design met very stiff resistance from the Basoga and Kyabagu and his army had to leave for Buganda. But this unity that the Basoga had built to resist the invading Baganda did not last; its collapse made the subjugation of the Basoga possible right up to the inception of British colonial rule. John Roscoe observes that as late as 1890 the Basoga did not only have to pay tribute to the Kabaka of Buganda (Kiwanuka,M.S.M. 1971:142-3; Wilson, C.T.& Felkin, R.W. 1882: 149; Roscoe, J. 1924:149), they were also politically tied to Buganda as some sort of tributary.

Even areas as distant as what later became known as Bukedi were not safe from Ganda invasions and plunder. (Rowe, J: 1967: 168) In 1863 there was a local dispute in Busoga. One of the disputants was called Kalende, whose maternal ancestry was in Bukedi, brought in a force of 'Bakedi' to aid him. The `Bakedi', being able warriors easily captured the estates desired by their nephew Kalende. However, Wakoli, the Soga chief who lost, petitioned Kabaka Mutesa, making sure he took with him an appropriate present of ivory. Mutesa summoned Kalende and kept him in prison for four to five months, duration long enough for Wakoli's subjects to reinstate themselves in the disputed villages. Eventually, when Kalende returned home feeling humiliated, he wasted no time in recalling his relatives to administer another beating of Wakoli. Wakoli too went right back to Mutesa who immediately dispatched an expedition to demonstrate to the 'Bakedi' the power and authority of the Kabaka of Buganda. Attracted by the wealth of cattle in Bukedi, the Baganda chiefs enlisted in large numbers. The "Bakedi" laid for the invading Baganda an ingenious military trap: they left the Baganda to enter their country with ease, only to ambush them on their return when they were encumbered with loot and booty. The whole rear division was annihilated in so decisive a defeat that Kabaka Mutesa found it wise not to attempt revenge. (Oboth-Ofumbi, A.C.K. 1959: 4-5)

The imperial tendencies of the kingdom of Buganda also affected the peoples inhabiting the area to the west of the kingdom and out of whom the British were to carve out the former kingdom of Ankole (4). Having annexed Buddu as we have already shown, Buganda not only raided the nascent Nkore 'empire', (Morris, H.F. 1960: 11-12) it also interfered in her internal politics and civil wars in attempt to place puppets on the Nkore throne. An example of both plunder and interference took place when Omugabe (King) Kahaya died and his son, Nyakashaija, was installed on the throne. To ensure firm hold of the throne, Nyakashaija attacked and defeated his elder brother, Rwabishengye. The defeated Rwabishengye sought aid from Kabaka Kamanya (1798-1825) of Buganda and entered Nkore with an army from Buganda. There was absolutely no justification for Buganda to provide Rwabishengye this assistance; it was well known throughout all the kingdoms of this region that the first-born prince never succeeds to the throne. The motive for this Ganda involvement in the politics of Nkore was plunder; and this soon revealed itself when, much as Nyakashaija fled from the invading forces, Rwabishengye, instead of taking over as the Omugabe, merely returned to Buganda with plunder. (Karugire, S.R. 1971: 179-80; Morris, H.F. 1960: 12) This had not been the first nor was it to be the last case of Buganda plundering Nkore. In the reign of Omugabe Gashyonga alone, Buganda, under the leadership of Kabaka Suna II (1825-1852), invaded and plundered Nkore three times.

When Omugabe Mutumbuka died around 1870 and the customary scramble for succession erupted, Mutesa of Buganda sent an envoy to intercede. Ostensibly Kabaka Mutesa's envoy was to make blood brotherhood with Makumbi, the leader of the Nkore delegation and the surviving legitimate claimant to the throne, something which is only undertaken in good faith from both sides. However, the envoy had secret instructions to kill as many as possible of Makumbi's supporters. At a meeting set at Kabula for the performance of the ritual, the supporters of Makumbi were led into a trap and no less than 70 leaders, including 20 princes, were massacred in cold blood. It was the height of treachery that was difficult to forget. Until recently, elderly Banyankore were still remarking to Professor Karugire: "Only the Baganda could have thought of such a thing."(Karugire, S.R. 1971:240) Fortunately, the faction with legitimate claims rallied around one of the princes of Nkore, and went on to defeat Mukwenda, the pretender to the throne supported by the Baganda.

The next injustice Ankole suffered in favor of Buganda was the loss of the territories of Kabula and some parts of the former kingdom of Bwera, which had been part of the grazing lands occupied by Nkore pastoralists. The events leading to this expansion of Buganda by the British began with the deposition of Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda. Some Baganda who could not accept this went over to Kabula and, basing themselves there, put up very spirited resistance to the British and erstwhile rulers in Buganda. Between 1897 and 1899 the resistance was so successful that they nearly closed the border between Buganda and Ankole -- only highly protected convoys could make transit between the two kingdoms. The authorities in Ankole were accused of failing to administer the area and, in 1899, the British Sub-Commissioner of Ankole District was instructed to remove the Munyankole chief from Kabula and replace him with a Muganda one. Henceforth the area was to be regarded as Buganda territory although it had been "on the "Ankole side of the border."(Karugire, S.M. 1971: 214)

Eventually, an empire, however powerful, gets to be challenged. This happened to Buganda in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Bunyoro, under the able leadership of Kabalega, not only got reorganized but also acquired muskets from the Arabs. On account of these two factors, Bunyoro "succeeded in driving the Baganda back, only to find that their final victory was frustrated by the arrival of the British who protected the Baganda with rifles and Maxim guns." (Danbur, A.R. 1965: 39) The Baganda, who were being seriously pressurized by the Banyoro, had gone into alliance with the British who had come to colonize the Nile valley and were looking for an ally. In any colony, outside control by a few thousand colonizers is impossible without winning allies from among the colonized peoples. A number of factors made the Baganda and not any other nationality the choice for this alliance: they had a fairly developed social and administrative system, a standing army of a sort, and a history of conquest and expansion stretching for three centuries. While the British consciously used the Baganda, to the Baganda their being used was mistaken for the continuation of their dominance and expansion. To the British, on the other hand, once "established in Buganda, their preferred method of consolidating themselves on the Upper Nile was simply to enlarge Buganda." (Roberts, A.D. 1962: 435) The two forces thus made perfect common cause in imposing colonial rule in Uganda.

The first operation the Anglo-Ganda alliance mounted was against their most serious threat, the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara. (Danbur, A.R. 1965: 84-87) This was in December 1893 when Colonel Colville led a full military campaign against Kabalega and the Banyoro. After suffering a series of defeats, Kabalega was driven from his country and forced to take refuge in Lango in 1894. As a reward for assistance against the Banyoro, Colonel Colville in the early part of 1894 promised the Baganda chiefs that all Bunyoro territory south of River Kafu would be incorporated into Buganda. This was roughly the area comprised of Buyaga and Bugangazzi (Bugangazzi) northern Singo, Buruli and the formerly semi-independent area of northern Bugerere which had been part of Bunyoro territory. (Dunbar, A.R. 1965; Roberts, A.D. 1962: 194) Colonel Colville was forced by illness to leave Uganda before implementing this promise. However, when E.J.L. Berkeley who succeeded Colville was in 1896 appointing a Munyoro to be chief of this area, the Ganda chiefs present reminded him that his predecessor had pledged the area to be part of Buganda. Berkeley consulted the Foreign Office who instructed him to implement the promise. The incorporation into the Kingdom of Buganda of this territory, which was clearly part of Bunyoro with Banyoro inhabiting, was so blatantly unjust that two British officers then serving in Bunyoro, Pulteney and Forster, resigned their posts in protest against the decision. Banyoro never accepted this situation and this loss of territory was to become the festering "lost counties" issue which was a subject of many deputations by the Kingdom of Bunyoro to the British throughout the colonial period.

The other victim of the Anglo-Ganda alliance was the former Kingdom of Toro. Formerly a mere province of the empire of Bunyoro-Kitara, Toro rebelled and seceded from the empire during Bunyoro's decline in the early part of the 19th century. By 1830, Toro had become a fully independent kingdom ruled by a Babito dynasty descended from Kaboyo. However, with the resurgence of Bunyoro under the leadership of Kabalega, Toro was brought back under Nyoro hegemony. Later, as a result of the defeat of Bunyoro by the Anglo-Ganda alliance, one of the major losses suffered by Bunyoro was Toro. Although Toro territory could not be added to Buganda, taking advantage of their warm relations with the British, the Baganda were to install Kasagama, a Toro princes who had been in exile in Buganda on the Toro throne. This suave move gave Buganda access to immense influence in Toro. Baganda became the most influential advisers at court, and were the teachers of Christianity. Eventually Luganda (the language of the Baganda) rather than Lutoro was to be used by officials of the government of Toro. Ganda customs and manners too did eclipse the Toro ones at court.

This Ganda sub-imperialism in Toro was soon to meet with very stiff resistance. (Steinhart, E.I. 1971: 105-107) It all began when Princess Bagaya, Kasagama's sister returned to Toro from captivity in Buganda where her anti-Ganda sentiment had been sharpened. She had been captured from Bunyoro where she was wife to Kabalega and taken to Buganda when the Anglo-Ganda alliance overran Bunyoro. In captivity in Buganda her relationship to the Baganda was that of a captive and hostile member of the dynasty of Buganda's arch enemy. It must have been heart-rending for her, on being repatriated to Toro, to be greeted in Luganda, the language of her captors, by her brother's messengers. Her brother's chiefs too addressed her in the language of her captors. Her food was prepared in Ganda style and Luganda hymns sung in praise of her return. Bagaya lost no time in becoming a champion of Toro customs and culture, and a focus of anti-Ganda sentiment in the kingdom.

While indirect influence was being exerted in Toro, other areas were being assimilated outright. On the very day of Ganda expansion into Bunyoro territory, in the areas that later constituted the "lost counties," the Kooki Agreement by which the former sovereign kingdom of Kooki was incorporated into Buganda was signed. This was done pursuant to the British strategy on the one hand, and the Buganda illusion of continuing three centuries of expansion on the other hand; both of which have already been alluded to. Two times, with Ankole and Toro being targets, there was a real possibility of this Buganda "expansion" westwards getting very serious. Faced with administrative difficulties in the kingdoms to the west of Buganda, Commissioner Berkeley had "proposed to and the foreign office agreed that in due course the whole of these two western kingdoms (Toro and Bunyoro), as well as Ankole to the southwest should be incorporated into Buganda, just as Kooki and large parts of Bunyoro had already been."(Morris, H.F. 1960: 44) To implement this policy with respect to Toro, in March 1897, an envoy of the Buganda Lukiiko (Council), with the foreknowledge of the colonial authorities, suggested to Kasagama that Toro should forfeit its independence and accept the "blessing" of becoming part of Buganda as Kooki and Kabula had done. In the proposed arrangement Kasagama would become a county chief within the Kingdom of Buganda. Kasagama both resented and rejected the offer. Needless to say such imperial desires by Buganda, and such bias by the British, was to irritate other nationalities and cause them to resent Buganda.

An ally who had up to then served the British so well, and who was to still serve them no one knew for how much longer, deserved a reward and an incentive. Such a prize came in the process of the constitution of the Uganda Protectorate and the newly constituted Buganda aristocracy. It took the form of an agreement or 'treaty', the Uganda Agreement of 1900 between the British and the new aristocracy the British had put in place to rule Buganda as representatives of the Kingdom of Buganda. The impact of the agreement was to accord Buganda a distinctive and privileged position as compared to the rest of Uganda. The agreement also enabled the Kingdom of Buganda to retain a degree of autonomy which served to preserve its political institutions, as well as secure her a favored position in the governance of the colony. Further, the agreement, by allocating land to certain chiefs, served to create a permanent ruling class in Buganda. (Rowe, J. 1964 :) Finally, apart from these concrete results, the very signing of the agreement - something which had not been done with the rest of the other peoples of Uganda, set off myths that the relationship between Buganda and the British was a quasi-diplomatic one; something which, though unreal, was to have significant implications in the later history of Uganda.

Meanwhile the British objective to impose colonialism in the north eastern part of what became Uganda, and the illusion that the Baganda were expanding an empire had dovetailed to give rise to a formidable army of the Baganda led by Kakungulu. (Gray, J.M. March, 1963; Thomas, H.B: 1936; Twaddle, M.) Three main interests had converged to constitute this army. Kakungulu had the ambition of founding himself a kingdom, the Baganda under his leadership desired war booty, and, the British wanted to subjugate the people of this area. The pattern of subjugation was "first an armed expedition would be made from an established fort to a new area; the pretexts were often obscure, sometimes a request for help from a warring faction or sometimes a threat of attack by local inhabitants; after skirmishes or pitched battles a new fort would be established and a garrison of Baganda installed." (Lawrence, J.C.D. 1955: 18 ref 7) Apart from the resentment that such foreign intrusion was bound to arouse, bitterness also came from Kakungulu's method of warfare which involved the erection of forts - one of which "took only three weeks to build and whose massive ramparts which can be seen to this day must have required the labor of many hundreds of unwilling workers." (Gray, J.M. 1936: 19) The practice of taking war booty that included women and cattle was another cause not only of immediate resistance, but of long-term hatred. And largely because the British were in the background, and the Baganda were the ones not only immediately prosecuting the war but also meting out what the people regarded as gross injustice, the brunt of resentment ended being targeted at the Baganda.

After every successful campaign to subjugate an area, the process of instituting an administrative system immediately followed. Like the campaigns to subjugate, the institution of administration too unleashed experiences which were to contribute to the dichotomization of the politics of Uganda, with Buganda on one side and the rest of the country on the other. This pattern arose from the British utilization of the Baganda in the initial administration of the colony. As early as 1893 Lugard had argued that "subordinate officials for the administration of Uganda (by which he meant Buganda) may be supplied by the country itself, but in the future we may even draw from thence educated and reliable men to assist in the government of neighboring countries (meaning the rest of Uganda)."(Lugard, F.D. 1893: 650) This argument was later to be accorded high official sanction by the Acting Commissioner of Uganda, F.J. Jackson, when he wrote: "The Baganda methods of administration though by no means perfect should be the standard." (Hansen, H.B. 1984: 368 ref 9) In line with this thinking, when time came for establishing an administrative system, not only was the Ganda administrative structure imposed on the other areas, the Baganda were also used as administrative agents in the initial administration of the colony.

There arose two dialectically related but contradictory responses to this policy. While their use as administrative agents and the adoption of their structure filled the Baganda with immense pride, the same process caused the rest of the country to feel a sense of deep humiliation. Professor Burke, the anthropologist who did a study of some areas in which the Ganda administrative system was imposed and agents used, was to observe that the subsequent political history of these areas is a product of rebellion against the Baganda. (Burke, F.G. 1964: 177; also see 14, 13, 17, 18, & 132) Yet the administrative system per se was not the only problem; the Baganda agents managing it not only expected feudal decorum which was unpopular with their subjects also had a very irritating condescending attitude to those who they considered beneath them. The overall effect of all of the experiences of those whom the Baganda were administering was a kind of internal colonialism, often much harsher and humiliating than the British one. The result was very spirited resistance to the Baganda agents all over the colony.

Perhaps the most determined resistance to the use of Ganda agents in administration came from Bunyoro. As a result of the spirited resistance to British intrusion the Banyoro had put up, the British officials viewed them as "hostile to programs and incapable of efficient government." (Steinhart, E.I. 1973: 48; also see Uzoigwe, G.N. 1972; and Santyamurthy, T.V. 1986: 200 ref 129) It therefore became necessary to introduce Ganda chiefs in Bunyono to serve as `tutors' to the regime of collaborators being established there. In 1901, the Ganda chief, James Miti was installed as chief in Bunyoro. This was soon followed by an increasing number of Ganda agents being appointed. By June 1902, the district officer in Bunyoro was observing "the very bad feeling that exists between the Banyoro chiefs, and those who have been brought from Uganda (meaning Buganda) and elsewhere and put in charge of some of the counties."(Steinhart, E.I. 1973: 50) This bad feeling was arising from the fears among the Banyoro that their once proud kingdom would be taken away from them by means of piecemeal annexation or expropriation by the Baganda as had been the case of the "lost counties." There was also the fear that the Ganda would eventually take over the full authority in Bunyoro, and thus turn Bunyoro into a colony of Buganda.

Eventually as the Nyoro chiefs and other relatively enlightened people gained confidence, they began to question the rationale of the use of Ganda agents as chiefs in Bunyoro. This questioning was to exacerbate as James Miti's territorial authority and influence over Duhaga, the Nyoro monarch intensified. Duhaga was sharply criticized by the Babito, the ruling caste in Bunyoro, for allowing the Ganda to gain a foothold in the kingdom, and for permitting himself to be controlled by his Ganda advisors. To these grievances must be added the cultural imperialism of the Baganda whose most painful aspect was the use of Luganda as the official language of state. The situation continued to deteriorate, and by 1907 the Banyoro could not take it anymore. In February the Banyoro rebelled: the Baganda chiefs were driven out of the countryside and sought refuge in Hoima, the capital. During the crisis, the Banyoro sent envoys to the neighboring kingdoms of Toro, Ankole and Busoga and "the lost counties" in the hope of finding allies who might extend the anti-Ganda rebellion through the Ganda dominated provinces. Although the revolt was eventually suppressed, the "Nyangire Rebellion", as it became known, lasted several months and had a long-lasting effect.

Northern Uganda too had its share of Ganda abuse. As administrators, the Baganda were brought into south western Lango (5) in 1907 and western Lango in 1909. (Ingham, K. 1958: 156-157; Roberts, A.D. 1962: 441) Considering the fact that the Langi had fought and defeated the Baganda in the battle of Dokolo, the Baganda were a very unfortunate choice for this task. Further, as John Tosh, the historian who did research on political authority among the Langi observed: "For such a delicate mission (establishing an administration), the Ganda agents were in many respects ill-qualified. They came from a highly centralized, hierarchical and competitive society. Traditionally, they despised those of their neighbors, referring to them as Bakedi (naked people). In the 19th Century the Ganda had raided the Bakedi for booty; they now saw their government authority as renewed opportunity for plunder and profit."(Tosh, J. 1974: 54) Between January 1910 and July 1911 alone, there occurred "109 conflicts between Baganda agents and their followers and the local natives, in which five agents and 10 followers have been killed, 6 agents and 11 followers wounded, and 170 natives killed or wounded."(Tosh, J. 1974: 51; 3-54; 58; 62 etc;)

The neighbors of the Langi, the Acholi (6) too suffered abuse in the hands of the Baganda. In the initial period of the colonization of the Acholi, there was a tendency to use the Baganda agents as administrators on the fringes of Gulu district. These agents were often inadequately supervised, a situation which resulted in the agents creating their little empires for themselves. Such behavior led to deep and widespread resentment which often erupted in violence and the killing of the agents. (Dwyer, J.W. 1972: 204 ref 72; also see note number 1) In Bugisu (7), too, where the Baganda had been used in violent imposition of colonialism, there was stiff resistance to the use of the Baganda as administrators. Dr. La Fontaine, an anthropologist who studied Bugisu observed that through the use of Baganda, the British "provided the Gisu with the stimulus of alien rulers, who not only appear to have despised those very cultural traits which symbolized tribal identity to the Gisu, but were prepared to proselytize their own way of life, which differed strikingly from traditional Gisu custom. An implicit comparison with the Ganda and a desire to achieve equal standing with them was an important strand in the development of Gisu tribalism."(La Fontaine, J.S. 1969: 183).

Neighboring Bukedi district too was a hotbed of resistance to the Ganda agents. In 1905 there erupted a serious and spontaneous revolt in Padhola country. The Ganda chief administering the area, Mika Kisaka had exceeded the instructions of the British Collector and was committing what the Jopadhola people felt were unbearable excesses. Furthermore, the Jopadhola people were incensed by the arrogance of the Baganda, and the perpetual sexual indulgence of the Ganda with the local women. In June 1905 two incidents which occurred simultaneously in two different parts of Padhola flared into violent revolts which resulted in the death of a number of Baganda agents.(Santhamurthy, T.V. 1986: 265-266)

The western region of Uganda too had its share of irritation from Baganda. In 1908, for instance, one of the Baganda chiefs who was administering Igara county in Ankole filed the following report: "I am writing to tell you about our district Egara, all the people here are rebellious, and they don't give us some food, if one of our men wants to walk about they want to kill him . . ." (Karugire, S.R. 1971: 232-3) Ankole's neighbors, the former district of Kigezi, too experienced resistance to the Baganda.(Hopkins, E.E. 1968 ) Here among the most irritating aspects of the Baganda agents was their use of the agency to exploit the people. A good example is the case of taxation. "The rupee was used as the currency for taxation during this period, and this was brought in by the Baganda, or only possessed by the chiefs. They would tell the people that one rupee, for example, would buy three goats, so that if a person failed to produce three rupees, he would have to pay nine goats. In this way a Muganda agent or trader would pay in rupees and take the goats, but if the goat owner refused, chances were that he would be arrested. Consequently, all his goats would be sold at the lowest prices." (Turyhikayo-Rugyema, B.1976: 124) Such naked injustice was bound to give rise to resistance. A number of uprisings took place during which a number of Baganda agents were killed. The resentment to the Ganda agents was to last long. Professor Santhyamurthy who conducted field research in Kigezi in the 1960s records that he "was regaled with many a tale of resistance to Ganda chiefs" by informants who were old enough to have lived during the period of Ganda rule. (Santhamurthy, T.V. 1986: 200 ref 128)

With the imposition of colonialism over Uganda completed, further development in the colony - whether initiated by the British or by the colonized people, should have been national in character as it was in other colonies. This was not the case in Uganda; development tended to assume a dichotomy: Buganda, on the other hand, and the rest of the country on the other. The initial cause of this trend is the fact that both the missionaries and the colonialist began their work in Buganda, thereby giving the kingdom a head start. This head start led to the "furthering the growth of Buganda relative to, and in part at the expense of, the other parts of the protectorate, sustained the sense of superiority felt by Baganda and indeed provided that sense with some factual support. In money terms the difference between them and others can be easily summarized: in Buganda the cash income per person has been about twice that in the Eastern Region and about four times that in the Western and Northern Regions. The differences in other respects are less easy to summarize but are similar: relative to other Ugandans, Baganda have been better educated, far more numerous among professionals and upper civil servants, more active in trade, and more likely to be found in the country's 200-odd small towns and trading centers, more of which have been located in Buganda then elsewhere. And when the pressures for independence began to be exerted, it was largely Baganda who initiated them.

To many Baganda these differences have justified their claims to superiority and leadership. To many non -Baganda the differences have justified instead national policies specifically designed to reduce them. The Baganda approach to national politics, then, expressed publicly as a desire to protect the institution of the kabakaship, has rested on two premises: that they should lead, and that their privileges, being the legitimate fruits of their superiority, should remain intact. The non-Baganda have rejected both premises. Historically they have more than once emulated Baganda in matters of colonial politics, adopted voluntarily or otherwise a number of Kiganda patterns, and to a large extent framed their personal and communal aspirations in the light of Baganda attainments. But with respect to the emerging national society, they have held strongly to the twin view that there are no compelling reasons why Baganda leadership is either necessary or desirable and that existing differences in material well-being between Buganda and the rest of the country should give way to a more equitable regional distribution of wealth and opportunity." (Hopkins, T.K. 1967:254)

Up to the eve of independence this yearning had been fragmented. However, when the struggle for independence--itself a struggle for national recognition began, this particulr form of recognition ended up being "bound up with the disclosing of new possiblities with regard to identity, which necessarily result in struggle for social recognition" of those other forms of identity. The forms of identity which is relevant to UPC is the nationality. It was on the eve of independence as the anti-colonial struggle was raging that the nationalities that had been dominated by the Baganda not only realised that their experiences at the hands of the Baganda were similar, but that they could come together to collectively wage struggle for recognition. This coming together was the formation of the Uganda Peoples' Congress. In UPC the experience of disrespect that had previously been fragmented and had been coped with separately became a motive force for collective struggle.

Understood in ths way, the emegence of of UPC involved/involves the experience of recognition in more than the regard already mentioned. "The collective resistance stemming from the socially critical interpretation of commonly shared feelings of being disrespected is not solely a practical instrument with which to assert a claim to the future expansion of patterns of recognition. For the victims of disrespect -as has been shown in philosophical discussions, in literature, and in social history -engaging in political action also has the direct function of tearing them out of the crippling situation of passively endured humiliation and helping them, in tum, on their way to a new, positive relation-to-self. The basis for this secondary motivation for struggle is connected to the structure of the experience of disrespect itself. As'we have seen, social shame is a moral emotion that expresses the diminished self-respect typically accompanying the passive endurance of humiliation and degradation. If such inhibitions on action are overcome through involvement in collective resistance, individuals uncover a form of expression with which they can indirectly convince themselves of their moral or social worth. For, given the anticipation that a future communication community will recognize them for their present abilities, they find themselves socially respected as the persons that they cannot, under present circumstances, be recognized for being. In this sense, because engaging in political struggle publicly demonstrates the ability that was hurtfully disrespected, this participation restores a bit of the in-Ell dividual's lost self-respect. This may, of course, be further strengthened by the recognition that the solidarity within the political groups, offers by enabling participants to esteem each other." (Honneth, A: 1995: 164)

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